According to a survey, two percent said the U.S. was the winner of the war, 16 percent said it was Israel, 21 percent believe Iran won the war, and as many as 61 percent responded that none of the mentioned parties won the war.
This survey reveals vastly different views among the general public compared to the narrative U.S. President Donald Trump has sought to create since the start of the war. Indeed, Trump has repeatedly claimed that the U.S. is the winner of the war, making such assertions even after the first day of the conflict, which then lasted for over a month.
The Economist also published a column titled "Donald Trump is the Biggest War Loser," commenting that this is why he wants to exit the war.
"Not all wars have winners. But every war has at least one loser, and if—a big if—the ceasefire marks the end of the war in Iran, the biggest loser will be Donald Trump. The conflict has set back his main war objectives and exposed the superficiality of his vision for a new way of using American power," the article states.
Peace remains fragile. America and Iran cannot agree on whether it includes Lebanon, which Israel is attacking so fiercely that the threat to a broader ceasefire appears deliberate. They also dispute how Iran should open the Strait of Hormuz, a U.S. precondition for negotiations. Their negotiating positions are so far apart that they cannot even agree on which plan to discuss in Islamabad over the weekend.
They further note that the best reason Trump will not return to war is that he now realizes he should never have started it in the first place. His aggressive, boastful posts threatening to destroy Iran seem like attempts to portray his withdrawal as firm and impenetrable. He knows a new war would unsettle markets and, after speaking of a "golden age" in the Middle East, he risks looking foolish.
The Economist also believes Iran has reason to exercise restraint, as the complete destruction of energy and transportation networks would make the country harder to govern. They also seek the lifting of sanctions and believe the U.S. cannot sustain troops ready for attack indefinitely.
"The most likely outcome, therefore, is a wounded Iranian regime clinging desperately to power and insisting on maximalist goals in negotiations. Iran has no navy or air force; it has also lost and expended many missiles and drones. To rebuild them, it will have to contend with the fact that its economy has been set back years after more than 21,000 American and Israeli strikes," The Economist notes.
They remind that Trump calls this a great victory, but it does not appear so when compared to his weak progress in achieving the three most important war objectives: making the Middle East safer and more prosperous by containing Iran; overthrowing the regime; and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power once and for all.
"The war has undermined regional security. Before it began, Israel had partially dismantled Iran's network of proxy militias. Yet, Iran has now established a new source of pressure through attacks on Gulf states and blocking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is attempting to charge for passage through the strait. Trump has even considered sharing these revenues. Gulf states and their partners will likely be able to resist such an assault on freedom of navigation. But conflict still looms," writes The Economist.
They conclude that Iran has a "dangerous regime," but a just war requires a sober assessment that violence is a necessary last resort.
"Instead, Trump treated Iran as a personal project, in which American power was meant to justify the lack of consideration for the consequences of an attack. Power alone is not enough. Sometimes it does not even bring victory," the article concludes.