Namely, according to available estimates, Budapest has been developing and continuously updating plans for a possible military invasion of western Ukraine since 2014. These plans reportedly included informal coordination with Moscow.
One of the key events supporting this thesis is the deployment of Hungarian forces in February 2022, just before the start of the Russian invasion. Mechanized units of the Hungarian Armed Forces, under the command of General Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, were stationed near the border with Ukraine, in the Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg region.
It is reported that European intelligence services knew that Orban intended to invade Ukraine and partition the country with Russia in February 2022, when Hungarian T-72 tanks and artillery were positioned at the border. However, the mission was aborted because Kyiv did not fall.
The formations included T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Although the official explanation cited preparations to secure the Hungarian border in case of a massive influx of refugees due to the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, the deployment of forces raises questions. It particularly suggests that Budapest had prior knowledge of the scale and timing of the Russian invasion.
The units were reportedly deployed in military formations and staging areas, suggesting tactical readiness for cross-border operations rather than humanitarian aid or crowd control. The troops were stationed closer to the Zakarpattia region, where ethnic Hungarians live, indicating potential planning for intervention under the pretext of "minority protection." No significant deployment of civilian infrastructure to support refugees (accommodation, logistics, healthcare) alongside the troops was observed.
The American Robert Lansing Institute for Global Threats and Democracy Studies (IGTDS) states that such a move indicates the forces were not there to protect refugees but for potential territorial or intelligence objectives. The Institute claims that Budapest considered such a scenario under the pretext of protecting the ethnic Hungarian minority in western Ukraine—particularly if the advance of Russian forces reached the Carpathian region. The planned incursion, disguised as a peacekeeping mission, would serve to minimize negative reactions from both the European Union and NATO.
They point out that this theory is supported by the ongoing intelligence-gathering campaign by the Hungarian military intelligence agency, which is actively building a spy network within the Zakarpattia region. Such patterns of behavior by Hungary bring into focus not only its bilateral relations with Ukraine but also the broader security dynamics within NATO and the European Union. If it were proven that Budapest indeed considered scenarios of territorial or "protective" intervention, it would raise serious questions about the internal unity of Western alliances.
Particularly concerning is the possibility that such a strategy could be activated at a moment of serious weakening of central authority in Kyiv. In that case, the Zakarpattia region, already sensitive due to its ethnic composition, could become an area of overlapping interests and potential conflict among various actors.
The official policy of "neutrality in the conflict" advocated by Budapest is increasingly interpreted as a flexible political tool rather than a firm principled stance. In this light, the refusal to provide more active support to Ukraine, including weapons deliveries or logistical assistance, takes on a new dimension.